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In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two
payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without
any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two
payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separabil-
ity condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that
there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents.
A social choice function, mapping payoff type proﬁles to outcomes, can be
robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equi-
librium on every type space achieves an outcome that is arbitrarily close to the
outcome generated by the social choice function. This deﬁnition is equivalent to
requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly
dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if
strategically indistinguishable payoff types receive the same allocation. We show
that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and
sufﬁcient for robust virtual implementation.
Keywords. Mechanism design, virtual implementation, robust implementation,
rationalizability, ex post incentive compatibility.
JEL classification. C79, D82.
1. Introduction
Suppose that a social planner would like to design a mechanism that induces self-
interestedagentstomakestrategicchoicesthatleadtotheselectionofsociallydesirable
outcomes. A social choice function speciﬁes the socially desired outcomes as a function
of the unobserved payoff types of the agents. The planner would like to be sure that
outcomes speciﬁed by the social choice function arise with probability arbitrarily close
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to 1: thus she requires virtual implementation. In addition, she would like every possi-
ble equilibrium to virtually implement the social choice function: thus she requires full
implementation. Finallyshewouldlikeeveryequilibriumtovirtuallyimplementtheso-
cial choice function whatever the agents’ beliefs and higher order beliefs about others’
types; thus she requires robust implementation. In this paper, we provide a character-
ization of when robust virtual implementation is possible in a general interdependent
preference environment.
One necessary condition for robust virtual implementation is ex post incentive com-
patibility: under the social choice function, each agent must have an incentive to truth-
fully report his type if others report their types truthfully, whatever their types. Ex post
incentive compatibility is sufﬁcient to ensure the existence of desirable equilibria, but,
as the existing incomplete information implementation literature emphasizes, further
restrictions on the social choice function are required to rule out other, undesirable,
equilibria. If a mechanism is to fully implement a social choice function, two types who
aretreateddifferentlybythesocialchoicefunctionmustbeguaranteedtobehavediffer-
ently in the implementing mechanism. The key result in this paper is a characterization
of when two payoff types are strategically distinguishable in this sense that they can be
guaranteed to behave differently. A second necessary condition for robust virtual im-
plementation is robust measurability: strategically indistinguishable types are treated
the same by the social choice function. We show that ex post incentive compatibility
and robust measurability are also sufﬁcient for robust virtual implementation (under
an economic assumption).
Thus the core of our contribution is an analysis of strategic distinguishability. Fix an
interdependent preferences environment, with a ﬁnite set of agents, each with a ﬁnite
setofpossiblepayofftypes,withexpectedutilitypreferencesoverlotteriesdependingon
the whole proﬁle of types. Two payoff types of an agent are strategically distinguishable
if they have disjoint rationalizable strategic choices in some ﬁnite game for all possible
beliefs and higher order beliefs about others’ types. Thus two payoff types are strategi-
cally indistinguishable if in every game, there exists some action that each type might
rationally choose given some beliefs and higher order beliefs. We are able to provide
an exact and insightful characterization of strategic distinguishability. If we have sets of
types, 	1 and 	2, of agents 1 and 2, respectively, we say that 	2 separates 	1 if knowing
agent 1’s preferences and knowing that agent 1 is sure that agent 2’s type is in 	2, we can
rule out at least one type of agent 1. Now consider an iterative process where we start,
foreachagent,withallsubsetsofhistypesetand,ateachstage,deletesubsetsofactions
that are separated by every remaining subset of types of his opponents. A pair of types
is said to be pairwise inseparable if the set consisting of that pair of types survives this
process. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they are
pairwise inseparable.
If there are private values and every type is value distinguished, then every pair of
types is pairwise separable and thus strategically distinguishable. Thus strategic indis-
tinguishability arises when the degree of interdependence in preferences is large. We
can illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose that agent i’s payoff type is i 2 [0,1]Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 47
and agent i’s valuation of a private good is i + 
P
j6=ij. Each agent has quasilinear
utility, i.e., his utility from money is linear and additive. We show that all distinct pairs of
types are strategically distinguishable if jj < 1=(I  1), where I is the number of agents.
All pairs of types are strategically indistinguishable if jj1=(I  1).
Ourcharacterizationresultforstrategicdistinguishability(Theorem1)comesintwo
parts. Iftwotypesofanagentarepairwiseinseparable, thentheybelongtoasetoftypes
that are not separable by a proﬁle of sets of types of that agent’s opponents. The set of
types of each opponent in that proﬁle is then not separable by a proﬁle of sets of types
of that opponent’s opponents. And there is a continuing chain of inseparable sets in
the chain. We prove that pairwise inseparable types are strategically indistinguishable
(Proposition1)byinduction, showingthatinanymechanismatanystageintheiterated
deletionof messagesthat arenever bestresponses andforevery setof typesin thechain
ofinseparabletypesets,acommonactionisplayed. Theinseparabilitypropertyensures
that we can always construct beliefs for each type that make the same message a best
response.
To show the converse result (Proposition 2), we construct a ﬁnite maximally reveal-
ing mechanism with the property that all pairwise separable types have disjoint sets of
rationalizable actions. The construction exploits the linearity of expected utility prefer-
ences and duality theory. Whenever a set of types of one agent is separated by a proﬁle
of sets of types of other agents, we are able to construct a ﬁnite set of lotteries such that
knowing the ﬁrst agent’s preference over those lotteries always rules out at least one of
his types. We can take the union over all such ﬁnite sets constructed for each proﬁle
of type sets where the separability property holds. We then construct a ﬁnite “test set”
of lotteries such that knowing an agent’s most preferred outcome in that test set im-
plicitly reveals his ranking of outcomes in all the original sets. Finally, we consider a
mechanism where each agent gets to pick a lottery with some positive probability, then
guesses which lotteries others chose and gets to pick another lottery, with small proba-
bility, contingent on other agents making the choice he conjectured, and so on. With a
large, but ﬁnite, number of stages this mechanism eventually leads pairwise separable
types to make distinct choices.
Our proof of the sufﬁciency of ex post incentive compatibility and robust measura-
bility (Corollary 1) for robust virtual implementation builds on an ingenious construc-
tion used by Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) to establish an extremely permissive result
for complete information virtual implementation. In Abreu and Matsushima (1992c),
they adapt the argument to a standard Bayesian virtual implementation problem; we in
turn adapt the argument to our robust virtual implementation problem.
While our sufﬁciency argument for robust virtual implementation builds on Abreu
and Matsushima (1992c), the interpretation of our results ends up being rather differ-
ent. Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) characterize virtual implementation in a standard
Bayesian environment, where there is common knowledge of a common prior over a
ﬁxed set of types, using the solution concept of iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies and restricting attention to well-behaved (ﬁnite) mechanisms. Bayesian in-
centive compatibility of the social choice function is a necessary condition: a standard48 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
compactness argument shows that the weakening to virtual implementation does not
weaken the incentive compatibility requirement. In addition, they show that a mea-
surability condition is necessary. Put each agent’s types into equivalence classes that
have the same preferences over outcomes, unconditional on other agents’ types. Hav-
ing distinguished some types by their unconditional preferences, we can then further
reﬁne agents’ types, by distinguishing types with different preferences conditional on
other agents’ types in the ﬁrst stage. We can continue this process of reﬁning agents’
types basedon preferences conditional onother agents’ types revealedso far. The social
choice function is Abreu–Matsushima measurable if it is measurable with respect to the
limit of this iterative reﬁnement. This seems to be a weak restriction that is generically
satisﬁed.1 Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) show that Bayesian incentive compatibility
and Abreu–Matsushima measurability are sufﬁcient as well as necessary for virtual im-
plementation in iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Robust virtual implementation is equivalent to requiring that there is a single mech-
anism that implements a social choice function, for all possible type spaces that could
be constructed for the environment with ﬁxed payoff types and utility functions for the
agents. It is instructive to see how to get from Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) to the
robust virtual implementation results in this paper.
Observe that Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)’s solution concept naturally uses
agents’ given beliefs about others’ types: when strategies are deleted, it is because they
are strictly dominated conditional on the agents’ beliefs. We want implementation for
all possible beliefs. We therefore establish our results under an incomplete information
version of rationalizability that does not make use of any beliefs over others’ types; it is
equivalenttoiterativelydeletingstrategiesthatareexpoststrictlydominated,i.e.,strictly
dominated for all possible beliefs over others’ types. We work with this solution concept
throughout the paper. However, results from the epistemic foundations of game the-
ory establish that an action is rationalizable in this sense for a payoff type if and only if
it could be played in an equilibrium on some type space with beliefs and higher order
beliefs, by a type with that payoff type (Brandenburger and Dekel 1987, Battigalli and
Siniscalchi 2003, and Bergemann and Morris 2008). Thus a bonus of our “robust” analy-
sis is that the distinction between equilibrium and rationalizability (or iterated deletion
of strictly dominated strategies) becomes moot.
Now, ex post incentive compatibility is the robust analogue of Bayesian incentive
compatibility and robust measurability is the robust analogue of the measurability of
Abreu and Matsushima (1992c). They can reasonably argue that, in a standard Bayesian
setting, their measurability condition is a weak technical requirement.2 As a result,
the “bottom line” of the virtual implementation literature has been that full imple-
mentation, i.e., getting rid of undesirable equilibria, does not impose any substantive
1Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and Serrano and Vohra (2005) note that a simple sufﬁcient condition
for all social choice functions to be A–M measurable is type diversity: every type has distinct preferences
over lotteries unconditional on others’ types.
2Although Serrano and Vohra (2001) describe an economic example where all non-trivial individually
rational and Bayesian incentive compatible social choice functions fail Abreu–Matsushima measurability
because types have identical conditional preferences.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 49
constraints beyond incentive compatibility, i.e., the existence of desirable equilibria.
By requiring the more demanding, but more plausible, robust formulation of incom-
pleteinformation,weendupwithaconditionthatissubstantive(imposingsigniﬁcantly
morestructureininterdependentvalueenvironmentsthanincentivecompatibility)and
easily interpretable.
Thispaperaddstoarecentliteratureonrobustmechanismdesignthatprovidesone
operationalization of the so-called “Wilson doctrine” that progress in practical mecha-
nismdesignwillcomefromrelaxingtheimplicitcommonknowledgeassumptioninthe
formulationofmechanismdesignproblems.3 Neeman(2004)highlightsthefactthatfull
surplus extraction with correlated type results (Myerson 1981 and Crémer and McLean
1985) rely on the implicit assumption that there is common knowledge of a mapping
from beliefs to payoff types of all agents (a “beliefs determine preferences” property).
This(counterintuitive)assumptionisimpliedbythe“generic”choiceofacommonprior
onaﬁxedtypespacewheredistincttypesareassumedtohavedifferentpreferences. The
apparentweaknessoftheAbreu–Matsushimameasurabilitycondition(andthefactthat
itissatisﬁedfor“generic”priors)reliesonthesameproperty. Webelievethatbyrelaxing
this unnatural implicit assumption, we get a better insight into the nature of the extra
requirementforfullimplementationoverandaboveincentivecompatibilityconditions.
Our operationalization of the “Wilson doctrine” is rather strong: we put no restric-
tions on agents’ beliefs and higher order beliefs. A recent paper of Artemov et al. (2008)
examines what happens to the conditions for robust virtual implementation if the plan-
ner is given partial information about agents’ beliefs, in particular, a subset of beliefs
over others’ payoffs types that can arise with each payoff type. We discuss this interme-
diate robustness approach in Section 6.3.
It is possible to interpret our result as rather negative: ex post incentive compatibil-
ity is already a very strong condition, as emphasized by the recent work of Jehiel et al.
(2006).4 Robust measurability adds the further substantive restriction that there not be
too much interdependence of preferences; and, in any case, the mechanism that we
use to robustly virtually implement social choice functions is complicated to describe
and presumably hard to play. However, we can show that in one large and interesting
class of economic environments with interdependent preferences, robust virtual imple-
mentation is not only possible but is possible in the direct mechanism where agents
simply report their payoff types. Say that an environment has aggregator single cross-
ing preferences if the proﬁle of agents’ types can be aggregated into a single number
and preferences are single crossing with respect to that number. Efﬁcient social choice
functions satisfying ex post incentive compatibility often exist in such environments.
Bergemann and Morris (forthcoming) show that in such an environment, exact robust
implementation is possible if the social choice function satisﬁes strict ex post incentive
compatibility and a contraction property. In this paper, we observe that the contraction
3Neeman(2004),BergemannandMorris(2005b),HeifetzandNeeman(2006),andChungandEly(2007).
4Although we argue in Bergemann and Morris (forthcoming) that ex post incentive compatibility is fea-
sible in many economically important environments either because types are one-dimensional or because
natural economic features of the environment lead to a failure of the “generic” properties that lead to the
non-existence of non-trivial ex post incentive compatible social choice functions in Jehiel et al. (2006).50 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
property is equivalent to robust measurability, so that, under the weak condition that
there exists some strictly ex post incentive compatible social choice function, whenever
robust virtual implementation is possible, it is possible in the direct mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the envi-
ronment and the solution concept. Section 3 illustrates the notion of separability in the
context of a single private good with interdependent preferences. Section 4 deﬁnes and
characterizes strategic distinguishability, constructing the maximally revealing mecha-
nism to show the equivalence between strategic distinguishability and pairwise sepa-
rability. Section 5 reports our results on robust virtual implementation. Section 6 con-
cludes with discussions of the formal relation between Abreu–Matsushima measurabil-
ity and robust measurability, the role of moderate interdependence, intermediate no-
tions of robustness, the epistemic foundations for the solution concept, weak rather
than strict dominance, positive results in direct mechanisms, and the relation to exact
rather than virtual implementation.
2. Setting
2.1 Environment
There is a ﬁnite set of agents f1,...,Ig and each agent i has a ﬁnite set of possible payoff
types
i =f1
i ,...,s
i ,...,S
i g.
We assume without loss of generality that the cardinality of each set i is equal toS for
all i. The ﬁnite set X of pure outcomes is given by
X =fx1,...,xn,...,xNg.
The lottery space over the set of outcome is Y = (X). A lottery y is an N-dimensional
vector y =(y1,...,yn,...,yN) with
yn 0 and
N X
n=1
yn =1.
Each agent has a von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility function ui : Y  ! R
with
ui(y,)=
N X
n=1
ui(xn,)yn.
We abuse notation by writing x for the lottery putting probability 1 on outcome x and X
for the set of degenerate lotteries.
It is often convenient to work with underlying preferences over lotteries rather than
any of their representations. We write R for the collection of expected utility preference
relationsonY. WewriteRi,i 2R forthepreferencerelationofagenti ifhispayofftype
is i and he has belief i 2( i) about the types of others:
8y,y 0 2Y y Ri,i y 0 ,
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(y,(i, i))
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(y 0,(i, i))Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 51
and we write Pi,i for the strict preference relation corresponding to Ri,i.
We make a weak assumption on the preferences: every agent i, whatever his type
i 2i and beliefs i 2( i), has a strict preference over some pair of outcomes.
Assumption 1 (No Complete Indifference). For each i, i 2 i, and i 2 ( i), there
exist x,x0 2X such that x Pi,i x0.
We maintain this assumption throughout the paper.5 An analogous condition ap-
pears in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and Serrano and Vohra (2005) in the Bayesian
setting for all types (and associated beliefs) of all agents. But in our robust context, it is
a stronger assumption in the sense that it rules out the possibility that alternative pay-
off type proﬁles of others lead to a reversal in the preferences of agent i with respect to
some x and x0.
We denote by ¯ y the central lottery that puts equal probability on each of the pure
outcomes. Now no-complete-indifference implies that every agent i, whatever his type
i and beliefs i 2 ( i), strictly prefers some pure outcome x to ¯ y; and compactness
implies that those strict preferences are uniformly strict.
Lemma 1. There exists c > 0 such that, for each i, i 2 i, and i 2 ( i), there exists
x 2X such that
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(x,(i, i))>
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i))+c.
This lemma is proved in the Appendix. We use c in our later constructions. We also
exploit the existence of an upper bound on payoff differences C that follows immedi-
ately from the ﬁniteness of pure outcomes and states
Lemma 2. There exists C >0 such that
jui(y,) ui(y 0,)jC
for all i, y, y 0, and .
2.2 Mechanisms and solution concept
A mechanism M is a collection ((Mi)I
i=1,g) where each Mi is ﬁnite and g : M ! Y.
We denote a belief of agent i over the product of payoff type and message spaces of
the other agents by i 2 ( i M i). We consider the process of iteratively eliminat-
ing never best responses, without making assumptions on agents’ beliefs about others’
payoff types. The set of messages surviving the kth level of elimination for type i in
mechanism M is deﬁned by
S0
i [M](i)¬Mi
5Ourresultscanbeextendedtoallowforthepresenceofcompleteindifferenceasshownintheappendix
of the working paper version, Bergemann and Morris (2007).52 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
and for each k =0,... by induction:
Sk+1
i [M](i)
¬
8
> <
> :
mi 2Sk
i [M](i)








9i 2( i M i) s.t.
(1) i( i,m i)>0)m i 2Sk
 i[M]( i)
(2) mi 2argmax
m0
i
P
 i,m ii( i,m i)ui(g(m0
i,m i),(i, i))
9
> =
> ;
.
We let
Si[M](i)=
\
k0
Sk
i [M](i).
We refer to Si[M](i) as the rationalizable messages of type i of agent i in mecha-
nism M. This incomplete information version of rationalizability is studied in Battigalli
(1999), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), and Bergemann and Morris (2008). A standard
and well known duality argument implies that this solution concept is equivalent to it-
erated deletion of ex post strictly dominated strategies.
The set Si[M](i) is the set of messages that type i might send consistent with
knowing that his payoff type is i, common knowledge of rationality, and the set of pos-
sible payoff types of the other players, but with no restrictions on his beliefs and higher
order beliefs about other types. Equivalently, it is the set of messages that might be
played in any equilibrium on any type space by a type of player i with payoff type i and
any possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about others’ payoff types. In Section 6.4,
we report a formal argument conﬁrming this interpretation. In the body of the paper,
we work directly with this solution concept.
2.3 Separability
We are interested in the set of preferences that an agent might have if his payoff type is
i and he knows that the type j of each opponent j belongs to some subset 	j of his
possible types j. Thus writing 	 i = f	jgj6=i for a proﬁle of subsets of i’s opponents,
we deﬁne
Ri(i,	 i)=

R 2R jR =Ri,i for some i 2(	 i)
	
.
We adopt the convention that if for some j 6= i, 	j = ?, then Ri(i,	 i) = ?. Now
suppose we observe i’s preferences over lotteries and know that i assigns probability 1
to his opponents’ type proﬁle  i being an element of 	 i. What can we deduce about
i’s type? We say that 	 i separates 	i if, whatever those realized preferences, we can
rule out at least one possible type of i.
Definition 1 (Separation). The type set proﬁle 	 i separates 	i if
\
i2	i
Ri(i,	 i)=?.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 53
We are interested in a process by which we iteratively delete type sets of each agent
that are separated by some type set proﬁle of his opponents. Thus writing k
i for the kth
level inseparable sets of player i, we have
0
i =2i (1)
and
k+1
i =

	i 2k
i j	 i does not separate 	i, for some 	 i 2k
 i
	
, (2)
and a (ﬁnite) limit type set proﬁle is deﬁned by

i =
\
k0
k
i . (3)
Finally, we say that two types are pairwise inseparable if they cannot be iteratively
separated in this way.
Definition 2(PairwiseInseparability). Typesi and0
i arepairwiseinseparable,written
i 0
i, if fi,0
ig2
i.
Note that the relation  is reﬂexive and symmetric by construction, but is not neces-
sarily transitive. The following “ﬁxed point” characterization of pairwise inseparability
is useful in the analysis that follows. Let =(i)I
i=1 2I
i=12i be a proﬁle of type sets for
each agent.
Definition 3 (Mutual Inseparability).  is mutually inseparable if, for each i and 	i 2
i, there exists 	 i 2  i such that 	 i does not separate 	i.
Lemma 3. Types i and 0
i are pairwise inseparable if and only if there exist mutually
inseparable =(i)I
i=1 and 	i 2i with fi,0
ig	i.
Proof. (if) Suppose there exist b =(b i)I
i=1 and 	i 2 b i with fi,0
ig	i. We claim that

	i j	i 	0
i and 	0
i 2 b i for some 	0
i
	
k
i
for each k = 0,1,... . The claim holds for k = 0 by deﬁnition. Suppose the claim holds
for arbitrary k and suppose that 	i 	0
i and 	0
i 2 b i. Because b  is mutually inseparable,
there exists 	 i 2 b  i  k
i such that 	 i does not separate 	0
i. By the deﬁnition of
separation, since 	i 	0
i, 	 i does not separate 	i. So 	i 2k+1
i and
fi,0
ig	i 2
i =
\
k0
k
i .
(only if) Observe that k+1
i  k
i for each k = 0,1,... by construction. Thus (
i)I
i=1
is mutually inseparable. Thus if i  0
i, there exists a mutually inseparable  with
fi,0
ig2
i. 54 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
3. An environment with interdependent values for a single good
We consider a quasi-linear environment with a single good with interdependent values
to illustrate the notion of separability. There are I agents and agent i’s payoff type is
i 2[0,1]. If the type proﬁle is , agent i’s valuation of an object is given by
vi(i, i)=i +
X
j6=i
j,
with  2 R+. The parameter  measures the amount of interdependence in valuations:
the case of private values is given by  = 0 and the case of pure common values is  = 1.
The net utility of agent i depends on his probability yi of receiving the object and the
monetary transfer ti:
ui(,yi,ti)=

i +
X
j6=i
j

yi  ti.
We determine the conditions for separability of types in this preference environ-
ment.6
Type set proﬁle 	 i separates 	i if, knowing i’s preferences and knowing that he is
sure that others’ type proﬁle is 	 i, we can always rule out some i. In this example,
because the utility function ui is linear in the monetary transfer for all types and all
agents, separability must come from different valuations of the object. For a given type
set proﬁle 	 i of all but i, we can identify the set of possible (expected) valuations of
agent i with type i by writing
Vi(i,	 i)=

vi 2R+ j9i 2(	 i) s.t. vi =i +
X
 i2	 i
i( i)
X
j6=i
j

=

i +
X
j6=i
min	j,i +
X
j6=i
max	j

. (4)
Now 	 i separates 	i if and only if
\
i2	i
Vi(i,	 i)=?.
This is equivalent to requiring that
Vi(max	i,	 i)\Vi(min	i,	 i)=?.
By (4), this holds if and only if
max	i +
X
j6=i
min	j >min	i +
X
j6=i
max	j.
6This example has a continuum of types and a continuum of deterministic monetary allocations while
the general model is deﬁned for a ﬁnite number of types and pure outcomes. We could rewrite the exam-
ple and the corresponding results without loss in the ﬁnite setting. With a ﬁnite model, integer problems
would need to be taken into account; in particular, the exact value of the critical threshold for moderate in-
terdependence would depend on the size of the grid. But as the grid becomes ﬁner, the critical thresholds
converge to the ones of the continuum example here.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 55
We can rewrite the inequality as
max	i  min	i >
X
j6=i
(max	j  min	j).
Thus 	 i separates 	i if and only if the difference between the smallest and the largest
elements in the set 	i is larger than the weighted sum of the differences of the smallest
and the largest elements in the remaining sets 	j for all j 6= i. Conversely, 	 i does not
separate 	i if the above inequality is reversed, i.e.,
max	i  min	i 
X
j6=i
(max	j  min	j). (5)
Now we can identify the kth level inseparable sets, described in (1)–(3), for our example.
We have
0
i =2[0,1]
and, by (5),
k
i =

	i 2k
i jmax	i  min	i 
X
j6=i
max
	j2k
j
(max	j  min	j)

.
Now by induction, we have
k+1
i =

	i jmax	i  min	i ((I  1))k	
.
Thus if (I  1) < 1, 
i consists of singletons, 
i = (fig)i2[0,1], while if (I  1)  1, 
i
consists of all subsets, 
i =2[0,1].
Thus if  < 1=(I  1), so that interdependence is not too large, every distinct pair of
typesarepairwiseseparable. If1=(I  1), everypairoftypesarepairwiseinseparable.
We note that the linear structure of the valuations vi leads to the strong converse result.
But the example illustrates the general principle that pairwise separability corresponds
to not too much interdependence. We state a more general result about the relationship
between pairwise separability and not too much interdependence in Section 6.2. We
also note that the argument surrounding the pairwise separability result relies on the
boundedness of the payoff type space. In particular if i =R, then pairwise separability
can only be achieved in the case of of pure private values, i.e. =0.
Ourlaterresultsshowthatif1=(I  1),nosocialchoicefunction(exceptforacon-
stant one) is robustly virtually implementable; but if  < 1=(I  1), any ex post incentive
compatible allocation can be robustly virtually implemented. One can construct gener-
alizedVCGpaymentssuchthatefﬁcientallocationisexpostincentivecompatibleinthis
environment if 1. Thus the efﬁcient allocation is robustly virtually implementable if
and only if <1=(I  1).
Ourresultonrobustvirtualimplementationinthisenvironmentcontrastswithwhat
happenswithstandardBayesianimplementation. Supposeweassumethereiscommon
knowledgeofacommonprioronthesetofpayofftypes[0,1]I. Supposeﬁrstthatagents’56 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
types are drawn independently. Then each type has different expected valuations of
the object and can easily be separated. Even if priors are not independent, for a “typi-
cal” choice of prior, the measurability condition of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) and
Bayesian virtual implementation are possible as long as incentive compatibility condi-
tions are satisﬁed. Ex post incentive compatibility (and thus Bayesian incentive com-
patibility for any prior) is satisﬁed by the efﬁcient allocation if 1.
4. Strategic distinguishability
4.1 Main result
Two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if there exists a mechanism where the
rationalizable actions of those payoff types are disjoint. Thus they are strategically in-
distinguishable if they have a rationalizable action in common in every mechanism.
Definition 4(StrategicallyIndistinguishable). Typesi and0
i arestrategicallyindistin-
guishable ifSi[M](i)\Si[M](0
i)6=? for every M.
The notion of strategic indistinguishability is related to the idea of incentive com-
patibility in the context of information revelation in a mechanism. The difference be-
tweendistinguishabilityandincentivecompatibilityarisesfromthetwocentralfeatures
of strategic indistinguishability. First, we say that two payoff types can be strategically
distinguished if there exists some mechanism and hence some outcome function for
which the types have disjoint rationalizable actions. In contrast, the analysis of incen-
tivecompatibilityistypicallyconcernedwithaspeciﬁcmechanismandhenceaspeciﬁc
outcomefunction. Second,strategicdistinguishabilityrequiresthatthetwopayofftypes
display disjoint rationalizable actions for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs. In
contrast, the analysis of incentive compatibility is typically concerned with a ﬁxed and
common prior belief of the agents.
The characterization of strategic indistinguishability is the key result in our charac-
terization of robust virtual implementation.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence). Types i and 0
i are strategically indistinguishable if and only
if they are pairwise inseparable.
This result is proved in two parts. First, Proposition 1 shows that under any ﬁnite
mechanism, if i and 0
i are pairwise inseparable, then the intersection of the set of ra-
tionalizable messages for i and 0
i is always non-empty. This observation follows easily
from our deﬁnitions.
Proposition 1. If i and 0
i are pairwise inseparable (i 0
i), then
Si[M](i)\Si[M](0
i)6=?
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Proof. By Lemma 3, if i  0
i, there exists a mutually inseparable  with fi,0
ig 
	
i 2i.
Now ﬁx any mechanism M. We show, by induction on k, that for each k, i, and
	i 2i, there exists mk
i (	i)2Mi such that mk
i (	i)2Sk
i [M](e i) for each e i 2	i. This is
true by deﬁnition for k =0. Suppose that it is true for k. Now ﬁx any i and 	i 2 i. Since
 is mutually inseparable,
there exists 	 i 2 i,R, and, for each e i 2	i,
e i
i 2(	 i) such that R
e i,
e i
i
=R.
Now let mk+1
i (	i) be any optimal message of agent i when he believes that his oppo-
nentswillsendthemessageproﬁlemk
 i(	 i)withprobability1andhasbeliefs
e i
i about
the type proﬁle of his opponents, i.e.,
mk+1
i (	i)2argmax
m0
i
X
 i

e i
i ( i)ui(g(m0
i,mk
 i(	 i)),(e i, i)).
By construction, mk+1
i (	i)2Sk+1
i [M](e i) for all e i 2	i.
By the ﬁniteness of the mechanism, there exists K such thatSk
i [M](e i) =Si[M](e i)
foralli, e i andk  K. Thusforeach	i 2i, thereexistsmi(	i)2Mi suchthatmi(	i)2
Si[M](e i) for each e i 2	
i. Thus there exists mi 2Si[M](i)\Si[M](0
i). 
The second part of the proof of the theorem is the converse result.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Maximally Revealing Mechanism). There exists M  such
that i 0
i )Si[M ](i)\Si[M ](0
i)=?.
Propositions 1 and 2 immediately imply Theorem 1. Proposition 2 is proved by the
explicit construction of a mechanism that leads every pair of distinguishable types to
choose different messages. We refer to the speciﬁc mechanism as the “maximally re-
vealing mechanism,” and spend the rest of this section describing its construction and
ﬁnding its properties.
4.2 The maximally revealing mechanism
We construct a mechanism that works for any environment. In the canonical mecha-
nism, each agent is given K simultaneous opportunities to select a preferred allocation
from a given “test set” of allocations. For each opportunity k to select a preferred al-
location, with k = 1,...,K, the agent is asked to report a proﬁle of possible choices by
the remaining agents in the opportunities preceding the kth opportunity. If the report
of the agent at opportunity k matches the choices of the other agents in the opportu-
nities below k, then he is given the right to choose a preferred allocation. On the other
hand, if his report fails to replicate the choices of the other agents in the opportunities
before k, then the designer simply selects the central lottery ¯ y. While the mechanism
is entirely static, it requires each agent to make a series of choices, each one contingent
on the choices of the other agents. In particular, by asking the agent at opportunity k to
match his report with the choices of the other agents at the opportunities before k, we58 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
introduce an inductive structure into the series of choices by each agent. We therefore
refer to the kth opportunity as the kth stage or kth step of the mechanism even though
the mechanism itself is entirely static.
The central aspect of the inductive structure of the choice mechanism is that it al-
lows us to analyze the behavior of the agent in the mechanism in terms of the iterative
elimination of dominated strategies. The precise construction of the choice mechanism
is based ontwo central concepts, the notion of atest set and the notionof an augmenta-
tion of a given mechanism. A test set gives each agent a ﬁnite set of choices and the
choice behavior by the agent allows us to distinguish between different types of the
agent. The construction of the set of test allocations relies on a few critical implica-
tions of our notion of separation. In turn, the notion of an augmentation permits us
to show that we can always construct a more informative mechanism on the basis of a
given mechanism.
4.2.1 A class of maximally revealing mechanisms Fix a ﬁnite “test set” of lotteries Y .
A maximally revealing mechanism offers each agent i a series of K opportunities to se-
lect a preferred allocation from Y . The set of messages for each agent in a maximally
revealing mechanism is deﬁned as follows. Let M0
i =f ¯ m0
i g and inductively deﬁne
Mk+1
i =Mk
i Mk
 i Y .
Thus M0
i = f ¯ m0
i g, M1
i = f ¯ m0
i g  M0
 i  Y , M2
i = f ¯ m0
i g  M0
 i  Y   M1
 i  Y , and so
on. The message mk+1
i of agent i in stage k +1 thus reiterates his message from step k
and announces a possible message proﬁle of the remaining agents in step k. Due to the
inductive structure of the messages, we can write a typical element mk
i 2Mk
i as a list of
the form
mk
i =fm0
i ,r1
i ,y 1
i ,r2
i ,y 2
i ,...,rk
i ,y k
i g, (6)
with m0
i = ¯ m0
i and each rk
i 2 Mk 1
 i and each y k
i 2 Y . The entry rk
i constitutes the
report of agent i regarding the message of the other agents in the previous stage k  1.
The message set of agent i is then given by M K
i .
The outcome function in the revealing mechanism is deﬁned as
g K,"(m)¬ ¯ y +

1 "K
1 "

1
I
 K X
k=1
"k 1
I X
i=1
I(rk
i ,mk 1
 i )(y k
i   ¯ y)

(7)
for some " >0, where I is the indicator function:
I(rk
i ,mk 1
 i )¬
(
1 if rk
i =mk 1
 i
0 otherwise.
For a given " >0 and positive integer K, we refer to the associated revealing mechanism
as
M K
" ¬(M K,g K
" ).
In words, the mechanism has K stages. In each stage k, an agent is asked to announce
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positive probability, gets to pick a lottery from Y . Lotteries from early stages are much
more likely to be chosen than lotteries from later stages. We can now analyze how the
series of messages can iteratively and interactively identify the types of each agent.
4.2.2 Characterizing rationalizable behavior for small " For sufﬁciently small " >0, an
agent’s choice of a message at the kth stage is independent of what messages he thinks
others will send at stage k and higher and thus also independent of K, the total number
of stages of messages that will be sent. We ﬁrst propose an inductive characterization of
the set of types of player i who could possibly send kth stage message mk
i , and denote
this set by ¯ k
i (mk
i ). We then verify with Lemmas 6 and 8 that our proposed inductive
characterization of rationalizable messages is correct for sufﬁciently small ".
Write BY 
i (i,i) for agent i’s most preferred lotteries in the set Y  if he has payoff
type i and beliefs i 2 ( i) and (with a minor abuse of notation) let BY 
i (i,	 i) be
agenti’spossiblemostpreferredlotteriesifhehaspayofftypei andassignsprobability
1 to his opponents having types in 	 i, so that
BY 
i (i,i)¬fy 2Y  j y Ri,i y 0 for all y 0 2Y g
and
BY 
i (i,	 i)¬
[
i2(	 i)
BY 
i (i,i).
We adopt the convention that if 	j =? for some j 6=i, then BY 
i (i,?)=? as well.
Let ¯ 1
i (m1
i )bethesetoftypesofplayeri whocouldpossiblysendﬁrststagemessage
m1
i . Since we ignore later stages, this is independent of " and K. Taking these sets as
given, we then ﬁnd the set ¯ 2
i (m2
i ) of types of player i who could possibly send second
stage message m2
i , and so on. We end up with an inductive characterization of the set
¯ k
i (mk
i ) of types of player i who could possibly send kth stage message mk
i . Thus
¯ 0
i ( ¯ m0
i )¬i,
and inductively deﬁne ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i ), where we recall that by the inductive description of
the message mk+1
i in (6), we have mk+1
i =(mk
i ,rk+1
i ,y k+1
i ):
¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i )¬
8
<
:i 2i






(i) i 2 ¯ k
i (mk
i )
(ii) ¯ k
 i(rk+1
i )6=?
(iii) y k+1
i 2 BY 
i (i, ¯ k
 i(rk+1
i ))
9
=
;. (8)
The set ¯ k
i (mk
i ) is meant to approximate the set of types of agent i for whom a speciﬁc
message mk
i is rationalizable in stage k. In some sense, the set ¯ k
i (mk
i ) is the dual to
Sk
i [M](i), which describes the set of messages mi that are rationalizable for a speciﬁc
type i in stage k. The role of the set ¯ k
i (mk
i ) is to track the information that can be
inferred from the choices of messages mi about the type i of agent i.
The analysis of the limit behavior of ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i ) is heuristic in the sense that the
inductive process assumes the properties (ii) and (iii) in (8). In particular, it is simply60 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
assumed that agent i in stage k +1 announces a past message proﬁle of the remaining
agents which could have been sent by some type proﬁle of the other agents, and that
agent i selects an allocation that is a best response to some belief in stage k +1.
Weusetwopreliminaryresultstoestablishformallythatthesesetscharacterizelimit
behavior for small " and large K. The routine proofs are reported in the Appendix. First,
we note that for any ﬁxed ﬁnite mechanism M, when we iteratively delete messages
that are not best responses, they are uniformly worse responses, i.e., there exists M >0
such that each of those deleted messages is not even an M-best response.
Lemma 4 (Uniformly Worse Responses). For any mechanism M, there exists M > 0
such that if mi 2Sk
i [M](i), mi = 2Sk+1
i [M](i), and i 2( i M i) satisﬁes
i( i,m i)>0)mj 2Sk
j [M](j) for each j 6=i,
then there exists ¯ mi such that
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)ui(g ( ¯ mi,m i),(i, i))
>
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)ui(g (mi,m i),(i, i))+M.
Second, we use the uniform lower bound in stating a key result about “augmenting”
mechanisms. We use this “augmentation lemma” in the construction of both the max-
imally revealing mechanism (in this section) and the canonical mechanism for robust
virtual implementation (in the next section). For each player i, ﬁx ﬁnite message sets
M0
i and M1
i and let Mi = M0
i M1
i . Fix g 0 : M0 ! Y, g 1 : M1 ! Y, and g + : M ! Y. Fix
0,1,+ 0 with 0 +1 ++ =1 and let g :M !Y be deﬁned by
g(m)¬0g 0(m0)+1g 1(m1)++g +(m).
We now consider the mechanism
M 0 ¬((M0
i )I
i=1,g 0)
and the augmented mechanism
M ¬((Mi)I
i=1,g).
We recall that the constant C > 0 is a ﬁnite upper bound on the difference in pay-
offs across all agents and all pairs of lotteries y and y 0, which we established earlier
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 5 (Augmentation). If +C 0M0, then
(m0
i ,m1
i )2Si[M](i))m0
i 2Si[M 0](i).Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 61
The lemma states that if the weight 0 put on the original payoff function g 0 in the
augmented mechanism is much larger than the weight + put on the other component
ofthemechanismatwhichm0 affectstheallocation, thenanyrationalizablemessagein
the augmented mechanism must entail sending a message m0
i that was rationalizable
in the original mechanism.
We now show that these choices are indeed the result of iterative elimination of
strictly dominated strategies. More precisely, we verify that ¯ k
i (mk
i ) is an upper bound
on the set of types who could send kth stage message mk
i in any M k
" for sufﬁciently
small ".
Lemma 6 (Limit). Suppose that BY 
i (i,i) 6= Y  for each i, i and i 2 ( i). Then, for
each k, there exists ¯ " >0 such that
fi 2i jmk
i 2S[M k
" ](i)g ¯ k
i (mk
i )
for all "  ¯ " and mk
i 2Mk
i .
Proof. By induction. The claim of holds for k =0, since

i 2i jm0
i 2S[M 0
" ](i)
	
=i = ¯ 0
i (m0
i ).
Now suppose that the claim holds for k. Thus there exists ¯ "k >0 such that

i 2i jmk
i 2S[M k
" ](i)
	
 ¯ k
i (mk
i ) for all "  ¯ "kand mk
i 2Mk
i .
Now observe that M k+1
" is an augmentation of M k
" and thus, by Lemma 5, there exists
¯ "k+1 2(0, ¯ "k] such that for all "  ¯ "k+1,
mk+1
i =(mk
i ,rk+1
i ,y k+1
i )2S[M k+1
" ](i))mk
i 2S[M k
" ](i). (9)
Now by the inductive hypothesis, we also have
i 2 ¯ k
i (mk
i ). (10)
We further observe that mk+1
i 2 S[M k+1
" ](i) also implies there must exist i 2
( i Mk+1
 i ) such that (1):
i( i,mk+1
 i )>0) mk+1
j 2S[M k+1
" ](j) for each j 6=i
and (2):
mk+1
i 2 argmax
¯ mk+1
i 2Mk+1
i
X
 i,mk+1
 i
i( i,mk+1
 i )[ui(g k+1,"( ¯ mk+1
i ,mk+1
 i ),(i, i))].
But note that (rk+1
i ,y k+1
i ), the last components of mk+1
i , affects only one additively sep-
arable component of the above expression. In particular, (rk+1
i ,y k+1
i ) must maximize
X
 i,mk+1
 i
i( i,mk+1
 i )I(rk+1
i ,mk
 i)
 
ui(y k+1
i ,(i, i)) ui(¯ y,(i, i))

, (11)62 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
which we can rewrite as
X
 i
X
fmk+1
 i jmk
 i=rk+1
i g
i( i,mk+1
 i )
 
ui(y k+1
i ,(i, i)) ui(¯ y,(i, i))

.
In particular, the later expression is zero if
i(rk+1
i )¬
X
 i
X
fmk+1
 i jmk
 i=rk+1
i g
i( i,mk+1
 i )=0.
But if i(rk+1
i )>0 and y k+1
i 2 BY 
i (i,i), where
i( i)=
P
fmk+1
 i jmk
 i=rk+1
i g
i( i,mk+1
 i )
P
0
 i
P
fmk+1
 i jmk
 i=rk+1
i g
i(0
 i,mk+1
 i )
,
then (11) must be strictly positive, by the premise of the lemma. Thus we must have
(rk+1
i ,y k+1
i ) chosen such that i(rk+1
i ) > 0 and y k+1
i 2 BY 
i (i,i). Now i(rk+1
i ) > 0, (9),
and the inductive hypothesis imply that
¯ k
 i(rk+1
i )6=? (12)
and
i 2(¯ k
 i(rk+1
i )) and y k+1
i 2 BY 
i (i,i). (13)
To wit, by the construction of the revealing mechanism (see (7)), the lottery y k+1
i speci-
ﬁed in (13) only affects the (expected) payoff of agent i when rk+1
i =mk
 i. It follows that
y k+1
i should be a best reply to some belief conditioned on the event that rk+1
i =mk
 i.
Now (10), (12), and (13) together imply that any message mk+1
i 2 S[M k+1
" ](i) sat-
isﬁes the three requirements in the construction of ¯ k+1
i (rk+1
i ) in (8) and hence for any
mk+1
i 2S[M k+1
" ](i) we have i 2 ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i ). 
4.3 Constructing a rich enough test set
Finally, we show that we can choose the “test set” Y  to be sufﬁciently large so that
Lemma 6 implies that, for sufﬁciently small " > 0 and sufﬁciently large K, the mem-
bers of any pair of mutually separable types are sending distinct messages in the (K,")
revealing mechanism.
Lemma 7 (Existence of Finite Test Set). There exists a ﬁnite test set Y  Y such that
(i) for each i, i, and i 2( i), BY 
i (i,i)6=Y 
(ii) for each i, 	i, and 	 i, if 	 i separates 	i, then for each i 2 	i and i 2 (	 i),
there exists 0
i 2	i such that
BY 
i (i,i)\ BY 
i (0
i,	 i)=?.
The proof of Lemma 7 is in the Appendix. The proof of Proposition 2 is completed
by the following lemma, establishing that the sets ¯ k
i are closely related to kth level
inseparable sets k
i , as deﬁned in (1)–(3).Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 63
Lemma 8. For all i, all k, and all mk
i 2Mk
i , ¯ k
i (mk
i )	i for some 	i 2k
i .
Proof. By induction. The claim holds for k = 0 by deﬁnition. Suppose for all mk
 i 2
Mk
 i we have ¯ k
 i(mk
 i)  	i for some 	i 2 k
i . Now ﬁx any mk+1
i = (mk
i ,rk+1
i ,y k+1
i ) 2
Mk+1
i . If ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i )=?, then we are done as the empty set is included in every 	i 6=?.
If ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i ) 6= ?, then we let 	i = ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i ) and 	 i = ¯ k
 i(rk+1
i ). Lemma 7(i) en-
sures that for every i and i, there exist y,y 0 2 e Y such that y Pi,i y 0. Thus any best
response involves setting rk+1
i equal to some mk
 i to which he assigns positive proba-
bility and choosing a strictly preferred lottery. By our inductive assumption, 	 i 2 k
 i.
Now suppose 	 i separates 	i and ﬁx i 2	i. By Lemma 7(ii), there exists 0
i 2	i such
that y k+1
i = 2 BY 
i (0
i,	 i). Thus 0
i = 2 ¯ k+1
i (mk+1
i ), a contradiction. We conclude that 	 i
does not separate 	i. 
5. Robust virtual implementation
In this section, we use the notions of strategic distinguishability and the maximally re-
vealing mechanism to establish necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for robust virtual
implementation. Virtual implementation of a social choice function requires a mecha-
nism such that the desired outcomes are realized with probability arbitrarily close to 1
(seeAbreu andMatsushima 1992b,c). Robustimplementation requiresimplementation
of a social choice function depending on agents’ “payoff types” independent of their
beliefs and higher order beliefs about others’ payoff types (see Bergemann and Morris
2008, forthcoming). Our deﬁnition of robust virtual implementation is the natural one
incorporating both these notions.
5.1 Deﬁnitions
Write ky  y 0k for the rectilinear norm between a pair of lotteries y and y 0, i.e.,
ky  y 0k¬
X
x2X
jy(x) y 0(x)j.
Definition 5 (Robust "-Implementation). The mechanism M robustly "-implements
the social choice function f if
m 2S[M]())kg(m)  f ()k".
The social choice function f is robustly "-implementable if there exists a mechanism
M that robustly "-implements f .
We can now deﬁne the notion of robust virtual implementation.
Definition 6 (Robust Virtual Implementation). The social choice function f is robustly
virtually implementable if, for every " >0, f is robustly "-implementable.
The relevant incentive compatibility condition required for our robust problem is ex
post incentive compatibility.64 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
Definition 7 (EPIC). The social choice function f satisﬁes ex post incentive compatibil-
ity (EPIC) if, for all i, i,  i, and 0
i,
ui(f (i, i),(i, i))ui(f (0
i, i),(i, i)).
Now, “robust measurability” requires that if i is pairwise inseparable from 0
i, then
the social choice function must treat the two types the same. This condition is the ro-
bust analogue of the measurability condition in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) as we
formally establish in Section 6.1.
Definition 8 (Robust Measurability). The social choice function f is robustly measur-
able if i 0
i ) f (i, i)= f (0
i, i) for all  i.
5.2 Necessity
It is well known from the literature on virtual Bayesian implementation (e.g., Abreu and
Matsushima 1992c) that the relaxation to virtual implementation does not relax incen-
tive compatibility conditions by a standard compactness argument.7
Theorem 2 (Necessity). If f is robustly virtually implementable, then f is ex post incen-
tive compatible and robustly measurable.
Proof. We ﬁrst establish ex post incentive compatibility. Fix any mechanism M that
robustly "-implements f . Fix  i and m i 2 SM
 i ( i). For any m0
i 2 Si[M](0
i), virtual
implementation requires
kg(m0
i,m i)  f (0
i, i)k". (14)
Now suppose that player i is type i and is convinced that his opponent is type  i
sending message m i. Let mi be any message that is a best response to that belief.
Then mi 2Si[M](i), implying that
kg(mi,m i)  f (i, i)k". (15)
In particular, by the best response property of mi,
ui(g(mi,m i),(i, i))ui(g(m0
i,m i),(i, i)). (16)
Now (14) and Lemma 2 imply

ui(g(m0
i,m i),(i, i)) ui(f (0
i, i),(i, i))


1
2"C, (17)
and (15) and Lemma 2 imply

ui(g(mi,m i),(i, i)) ui(f (i, i),(i, i))


1
2"C. (18)
7Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Ledyard (1979) argue in a private value environment that dominant strategy
incentive compatibility is implied by Bayesian incentive compatibility for all priors on a ﬁxed type space.
In the case of a social choice function, this argument, generalized to interdependent values, shows the
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Now combining (16), (17), and (18), we obtain
ui(f (i, i),(i, i))ui(f (0
i, i),(i, i)) "C.
But virtual implementation implies that this holds for all " >0, so we have
ui(f (i, i),(i, i))ui(f (0
i, i),(i, i)),
and this establishes EPIC as a necessary condition.
Next we establish robust measurability. Suppose that f is robustly virtually imple-
mentable. Fixany" >0. Since f isrobustlyvirtuallyimplementable,thereexistsamech-
anism M" such that
m 2S[M"]())kg(m)  f ()k".
Now ﬁx any  i and m"
 i 2S i[M"]( i). Also ﬁx any i  0
i, so by Proposition 1 there
exists
m"
i 2Si[M"](i)\Si[M"](0
i).
Now kg(m"
i ,m"
 i)  f (i, i)k  " and kg(m"
i ,m"
 i)  f (0
i, i)k  ". Thus kf (i, i) 
f (0
i, i)k2". This is true for each " >0, so f (i, i)= f (0
i, i). 
While we maintain the assumption that the mechanism is ﬁnite, the same argument
impliesthenecessityofEPICandrobustmeasurabilityifweallow“regularmechanisms”
(Abreu and Matsushima 1992c), i.e., mechanisms where best replies always exist for any
conjecture over opponents’ behavior.
5.3 Sufﬁciency
We ﬁrst describe the construction of a canonical mechanism that we use to establish
sufﬁciency. Our construction follows the logic of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), which
in turn builds on Abreu and Matsushima (1992b). In the mechanism we construct, each
agent simultaneously announces (i) a message in the maximally revealing mechanism
described above and (ii) L announcements of his payoff type. With probability close to
1=L, the outcome is chosen according to the agents’ lth announcement of their payoff
types in part (ii) of their messages. But with small probability, the outcome is chosen ac-
cording to the maximally revealing mechanism and their part (i) messages. The mech-
anism then checks to see which agent was the “ﬁrst” to “lie,” in the sense that his lth
report of his type is not consistent with the message he sent in the maximally revealing
mechanism and no other agent sent an inconsistent message in an “earlier” report. If
an agent is not one of the ﬁrst to lie, then the agent is rewarded. For this part of the
mechanism, we need an economic property.
Definition 9 (Economic Property). The uniform economic property is satisﬁed if there
exists a proﬁle of lotteries (zi)I
i=1 such that, for each i and , ui(zi,) > ui(¯ y,) and
uj(¯ y,)uj(zi,) for all j 6=i.66 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
Under the uniform economic property, there exists a constant c0 such that
ui(zi,)>ui(¯ y,)+c0
for all i and .
In the canonical mechanism, part (i) announcements for the maximally revealing
mechanism are made as if the maximally revealing mechanism were being played as
a stand-alone mechanism (since the probability of rewards can be chosen sufﬁciently
small). An agent never allows himself to be one of the ﬁrst to lie: sending a message that
ensures that he is not the ﬁrst to lie (given his beliefs about the others’ strategies) always
strictlyimproveshisexpectedpayoff,sinceiftheothersaretellingthetruth,truth-telling
is a weak best response by ex post incentive compatibility, and if they are lying, for sufﬁ-
ciently large L the reward outweighs the cost of not lying in one stage of the mechanism.
We write M  = ((M
i)I
i=1,g ) for the maximally revealing mechanism. We use three
numbers in deﬁning the canonical mechanism. The number c0 is the uniform lower
bound on an agent’s utility gain from having his uniformly preferred lottery rather than
the central lottery. Recall from Lemma 2 thatC is an upper bound on payoff differences
in the environment, and recall from Lemma 4 that whenever a message is deleted in
the iterated deletion process for the maximally revealing mechanism M , it is not even
an M-best response to any conjecture. We use these three numbers c0, C, and M,
together with the number of players I, to deﬁne two further numbers  and L that we
use in the construction of the canonical mechanism. Choose  >0 such that
 <
M
C
(19)
and an integer L such that
L >
IC
2c0
. (20)
Now the message space of the canonical mechanism is
Mi =M
i 
L times
z }| {
i i =M
i L
i .
Thus a typical message is written as mi = (m0
i ,m1
i ,...,mL
i ), with m0
i 2 M
i; ml
i 2 i for
each l = 1,...,L. The idea is that an agent is “supposed” to truthfully report his payoff
typeineachstagel =1,...,L andreceivesasmallpunishmentifheisoneofthe“ﬁrst”to
report a type that is not consistent with his 0-th message. The small individual rewards
and punishments are provided by
ri(m)=
8
<
:
¯ y if 9k 2f1,...,Lg s.t. m0
i = 2Si[M ](mk
i )
and m0
j 2Sj[M ](ml
j )8j =1,...,I and l =1,...,k  1
zi if otherwise.
(With a slight abuse of notation, we use ri(m) here to denote rewards, rather than rk
i as
in Section 4.2.1.) Now the outcome function of the canonical mechanism is
g(m)=(1  2)
1
L
L X
l =1
f (ml)+g (m0)+
2
I
I X
i=1
ri(m).Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 67
The mechanism g(m) has three components. The ﬁrst component, which carries
the largest probability, is the social choice function f itself. The appropriate allocation
f (ml) is selected by L replicas, each one of which is chosen with the small probability
1=L. The second component is the maximally revealing mechanism outcome function
g , which receives a smaller weight of . The third and ﬁnal component, ri(m), repre-
sents a small reward or punishment. It is designed to give each agent an incentive to
replicate in stage l the report issued in the previous stage. It provides a small “punish-
ment” (¯ y) if player i is the ﬁrst to report in the message component, ml
i , a type incon-
sistent with previous reports; otherwise ri(m) provides the small “reward” zi.
Theorem 3. Under the uniform economic property, if f satisﬁes EPIC and robust mea-
surability, then the canonical mechanism (1+) robustly implements f .
This immediately implies the sufﬁciency part of our characterization of robust vir-
tual implementation, since we can choose  arbitrarily close to 0 in the canonical
mechanism.
Corollary 1 (Sufﬁciency). Under the uniform economic property, if f satisﬁes EPIC and
robust measurability, then f is robustly virtually implementable.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it is enough to establish that, for each i, mi = (m0
i ,
m1
i ,...,mL
i ) 2 Si[M](i) implies that (1) m0
i 2 Si[M ](i) and (2) m0
i 2 Si[M ](ml
i ) for
each l = 1,...,L. To see why, observe that m0
i 2 Si[M ](i) \Si[M ](ml
i ) implies i
is strategically indistinguishable from ml
i , which implies, by robust measurability, that
f (ml
i ,ml
 i) = f (i,ml
 i). Since this holds for each i, we have f (ml) = f (). Since this is
true for each l, the mechanism selects f () with probability at least 1  2.
Claim (1) above, that (m0
i ,m1
i ,...,mL
i ) 2Si[M](i) ) m0
i 2Si[M ](i), follows from
Lemma 5 and inequality (19), since m0 inﬂuences the outcome only through weight 
on g (m0) and weight 2 on (1=I)
PI
i=1ri(m).
We now establish claim (2) above, that (m0
i ,m1
i ,...,mL
i ) 2 Si[M](i) ) m0
i 2
Si[M ](ml
i ) for all i and l =1,...,L.
Suppose this claim were false. Then there would exist a smallest l for which the
claim fails. Thus there would exist l  2 f1,...,Lg such that, for all j, mj 2Sj[M ](j) )
m0
j 2 Sj[M ](ml
j ) for all 1  l < l ; but there exist i and mi = (m0
i ,m1
i ,...,mL
i ) 2
Si[M ](i) with m0
i = 2 Si[M ](ml 
i ). Now ﬁx any conjecture i 2 ( i  M i) with
i( i,m i)>0)mj 2Sj[M ](j) for all j 6=i. Consider two cases. First, suppose that
i( i,m i)>0) m0
j 2Sj[M ](ml
j ) for all j 6=i and l =1,...,L. (21)
In this case, sending the message
¯ mi =(m0
i ,
L times
z }| {
i,i,...,i)
instead of mi strictly increases i’s utility: since he is certain that each agent is reporting
a type that is strategically indistinguishable in each of the L stages, EPIC and robust68 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
measurability ensure that his utility does not decrease from truthtelling in the L stages;
his utility is unchanged in the maximally revealing mechanism; and his utility is strictly
increased in the punishment component. Secondly, i’s conjecture i is such that (21)
fails. In this case, we can deﬁne
b l =min

l 2f1,...,Lgj
9( i,m i) with i( i,m i)>0 and m0
j = 2Sj[M ](ml
j ) for some j 6=i
	
.
Note that b l l . Now sending the message
¯ mi =(m0
i ,
b l times
z }| {
i,i,...,i,m
b l+1
i ,...,mL
i )
instead of mi strictly increases i’s utility by the following argument. Since he is certain
that each agent is reporting a type that is strategically indistinguishable in each of the
ﬁrst b l  1 stages, EPIC and robust measurability ensure that his utility does not decrease
from truthtelling in the ﬁrst b l  1 stages, and his utility is unchanged in the maximally
revealing mechanism. If it turns out that m0
j 2 Sj[M ](m
b l
j ) for some j 6= i, then i’s
utility is also not reduced in the b l-th stage or in the punishment component, but if it
turns out that m0
j = 2Sj[M ](m
b l
j ) for all j 6= i, then i’s utility is reduced in the b l -th stage
by at most (1  2)(1=L)C and increases in his own punishment component ri() by
at least (2=I)c0 (and by the economic property, does not decrease in his opponents’
punishment components r i()). The second term exceeds the ﬁrst term by (20).
We conclude that for no conjecture is mi a best response, contradicting our original
assumption. This proves our second claim. 
While the basic construction of this proof follows Abreu and Matsushima (1992c),
some complications arise in our robust formulation. The messages sent in the max-
imally revealing mechanism do not partition an agent’s types. Rather, for each set of
types that survives the iterated deletion of sets that can always be separated, there is a
messagethatmaybesentbyalltypesinthatset. Sowesaythatmessageml
i isconsistent
with m0
i if message m0
i is one that might be sent by m0
i 2Si[M ](ml
i ).
The economic property can be weakened along the lines of Assumption 2 in Abreu
and Matsushima (1992c). It would be enough to have the economic property hold for
any type set proﬁle 	 in the inseparable type set , i.e. for each set proﬁle 	=(	i)I
i=1 2
, there exists (zi)I
i=1 such that, for each i and  2 I
i=1	j, ui(zi,) > ui(¯ y,) and
uj(¯ y,)uj(zi,) for all j 6=i.
6. Discussion
6.1 Abreu–Matsushima measurability
We establish in the preceding section that robust measurability, jointly with ex post in-
centive compatibility, is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for robust virtual imple-
mentation. Ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent to Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility on the union of all type spaces (Bergemann and Morris 2005b). We now showTheoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 69
that robust measurability is equivalent to requiring that the notion of measurability
originally suggested by Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) holds on the union of all type
spaces.8 To spell out the details of this equivalence result, we need a formal language for
epistemictype spacesin thesense ofHarsanyi (1967–68)and Mertensand Zamir(1985).
Atypespace isdeﬁnedbyT ¬(Ti, b i, b i)I
i=1,whereeachTi isacountablesetoftypes,
the function b i : Ti ! (T i) deﬁnes the beliefs that agent i assigns to other agents
having types t i, and the function b i : Ti ! i deﬁnes the agent i’s payoff types. A type
space is ﬁnite if each Ti is ﬁnite. We ﬁx a type space T and write T
ti for the induced
preferences of type ti of agent i over type-contingent lotteries e yi :T i !Y. Thus
e yi ti e y 0
i if and only if
X
t i2T i
b i(t i jti)ui(e yi(t i),t)
X
t i2T i
b i(t i jti)ui(e y 0
i(t i),t).
Fix a partition proﬁle H = (Hi)I
i=1, where each Hi is a partition of Ti. A function
e yi :T i !Y is H -measurable if for all j 6=i

tj,t 0
j
	
Hj 2Hj ) e y(tj,t fi,jg)= e y(t 0
j,t fi,jg).
Say that types ti and t 0
i are (T ,H )-distinguishable if there exists a H -measurable e yi :
T i !Y such that
e yi T
ti ¯ y and ¯ y T
t 0
i
e yi,
where we continue to denote by ¯ y the constant uniform lottery.
Now iteratively deﬁne a sequence of partitions H k =(H k
i )I
i=1 by letting each H 0
i be
the coarsest partition of the type set Ti, namely fTig, and letting each H k+1
i consist of
sets of types of agent i that are (T ,H k)-indistinguishable.
Let H  be the limit of the sequence of partitions. We say that types ti and t 0
i are
Abreu–Matsushima, or “AM”, indistinguishable on type space T , written ti T
AM t 0
i, if ti
and t 0
i are in the same element of the partition H 
i .
Proposition 3 (Equivalence).
(i) If i and 0
i are pairwise inseparable, then there exists a ﬁnite type space T and
types ti,t 0
i 2Ti such that (a) b i(ti)=i, (b) b i(t 0
i)=0
i, and (c) ti T
AM t 0
i.
(ii) Conversely, if there exists a type space T (perhaps inﬁnite but countable) and types
ti,t 0
i 2 Ti such that (a) b i(ti) = i, (b) b i(t 0
i) = 0
i, and (c) ti T
AM t 0
i, then i and 0
i
are pairwise inseparable.
The equivalence result of Proposition 3 suggests an alternative route to establishing
the necessity result for robust implementation in Theorem 2: by the equivalence of ro-
bustmeasurabilityandAMmeasurabilityontheunionofalltypespaces,wecouldprove
the necessity by an appeal to the arguments used in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c). By
contrast, our sufﬁciency result (Theorem 3) cannot be established using the arguments
8We would like to thank an anonymous referee who suggested that we investigate the exact relationship
between Abreu–Matsushima measurability and robust measurability.70 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
and methods in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c): as the union of all type spaces is not a
ﬁniteobject,theargumentsinAbreuandMatsushima(1992c)—whichrelyontheﬁnite-
ness of the type space—cannot be applied.
6.2 Interdependence and pairwise separability
WeillustratethenotionsofpairwiseandmutualinseparabilityinSection3inthecontext
of a linear model of interdependent preferences for a single object:
vi(i, i)=i +
X
j6=i
j.
In this linear and symmetric model the parameter  represents the level of interdepen-
dence in the preferences of the agents. We show that for <1=(I  1), all payoff types of
all agents are pairwise separable and suggest that pairwise separability requires not too
much interdependence in the preferences.
Wenowestablishtherelationshipbetweenpairwiseinseparabilityandmoderatein-
terdependence in a substantially more general environment. We assume that the utility
function of each agent i is given by a convex combination of a private value utility func-
tion vi and an interdependent utility function wi over the general space of lotteries Y
deﬁned in Section 2. The private value utility function
vi :Y i !R,
gives rise to distinct preferences for every i:
i 6=0
i )vi(,i) is not an afﬁne transformation of vi(,0
i).
The interdependent utility function
wi :Y  i !R
can depend in an arbitrary way on the type proﬁle  i 2  i of all agents except agent
i. For any i 2 [0,1], let u
i
i be the utility function that puts weight 1 i on the private
value utility vi and weight i on the interdependent utility wi:
u
i
i (y,)¬(1 i)vi(y,i)+iwi(y, i).
The interdependence in the preferences is now described by the vector of weights  =
(1,...,I) 2 [0,1]I. For  = (0,...,0) all payoff types of all agents are pairwise separable
as, by assumption, the private utility function vi gives rise to distinct preferences for all
i. Also, for  = (1,...,1), we cannot separate any pair of types for any agent. In this
case, the preferences of each agent are independent of his payoff type and therefore
we cannot expect to separate the payoff types of agent i on the basis of his revealed
preference. We parametrize the limit set  that by Deﬁnition 2 describes the set of
pairwise inseparable types, by the vector , or ().Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 71
Proposition 4 (Interdependence).
(i) The collection of sets 
i() satisﬁes 
i(0) =

f1
i g,...,fS
i g
	
and 
i(1) = 2i n? for
all i.
(ii) If b , then 
i()
i(b ).
The ﬁrst part of the proposition determines the structure of the pairwise separable
typeswithminimalandmaximalinterdependence. Thesecondpartestablishesthatthe
sets of pairs of types i and 0
i that are inseparable are weakly increasing in the interde-
pendence parameter . In particular, it shows that the separability is monotone in the
parameter of interdependence. We should emphasize that as the interdependence is
represented by the vector  = (1,...,I), the threshold for complete separability of all
typesandallagentsitselfisamultidimensionalsurfaceinthe I-dimensionalhypercube.
6.3 Intermediate robustness notions
The classic Bayesian implementation literature considers implementation on a ﬁxed
type space. We believe that this approach—as usually formulated—assumes too much
common knowledge (among the agents and the planner) about the environment. In re-
laxing these common knowledge assumptions, we take an extreme approach: we main-
taintheassumptionthatthereiscommonknowledgeofthepayoffstructureoftheenvi-
ronment (i.e., the set of possible payoff types of each agent and how each agent’s utility
function depends on the proﬁle of payoff types) but do not restrict agents’ beliefs and
higher order beliefs about other agents’ types.
In a recent paper, Artemov et al. (2008) consider what happens to robust virtual im-
plementation results if one imposes some restrictions on agents’ beliefs in the payoff
environment. In particular, call a pair (i,i) 2 i ( i) a “pseudo-type” and sup-
pose that we add the common knowledge that agent i’s pseudo-type (i,i) belongs to
a subset Ti  i ( i). When can a social choice function be virtually implemented
on all type spaces where each agent i’s pseudo-type belongs to Ti? Note that an agent’s
pseudo-type pins down his payoff type and belief about others’ payoff types, but not
his higher order beliefs. Thus this assumption is intermediate between the standard ap-
proach and our robustness approach. In the special case where Ti = i ( i), this
setting becomes the setting of this paper. But if Ti is a strict subset of i ( i), the
conditions for robust virtual implementation are weakened.
Now say that “pseudo-type diversity” is satisﬁed if
1. The set of beliefs consistent with a payoff type is a compact set, i.e., fi 2( i)j
(i,i)2Tig is a compact set for each i and i 2i.
2. Twodistinctpayofftypescannothavethesamepreferenceoverconstantlotteries,
i.e., (i,i),(0
i,0
i)2Ti and i 6=0
i )Ri,i 6=R0
i ,0
i.
Artemov et al. (2008) show that if pseudo-type diversity is satisﬁed, then robust vir-
tual implementation is always possible if the appropriate incentive compatibility con-
ditions are satisﬁed (their Theorem 1). The idea is that agents’ payoff types can then be72 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
identiﬁed by their preferences over constant lotteries and the Abreu and Matsushima
(1992c)-style argument applied.9
To get a feel for the strength of the pseudo-type diversity condition, we can return to
our leading example in Section 3. Recall that each i = [0,1] and vi = i +Ei[
P
j6=ij]
is a sufﬁcient statistic for agent i’s preferences. Now let i  ([0,1]I 1) be a compact
set of beliefs over others’ types that agent i may have (whatever his payoff type), so his
set of possible pseudo-types is the product set Ti = [0,1]i. Now if 0 <   1=(I  1),
so there is not too much interdependence of preferences, pseudo-type diversity will be
satisﬁed if and only if each i is a singleton.10
Artemov et al. (2008) also report the appropriate measurability condition required
for robust virtual implementation if the pseudo-type diversity condition fails (their Def-
inition 12 and Theorem 2). This is naturally intermediate between Abreu–Matsushima
measurability and our robust measurability condition. We can illustrate this also with
our example. Suppose that the probability that agent i assigns to any subset of other
agents’ payoff types is always at least 1  times the probability of that event under a
uniform prior, so that
i =
(
i 2( i)ji(E)(1 )
Z
 i2E
d i, 8 measurable E [0,1]I 1
)
and Ti =i i.
Now suppose that agent i’s payoff type is in 	i and he knows that other agents’ pay-
off types are in 	 i. If agent i’s beliefs are restricted to belong to i, when does there
exist a pair of payoff types in 	i who could not have the same expected valuation of the
object? Only if
max	i +
X
j6=i
((1 )
1
2 +min	j)>min	i +
X
j6=i
((1 )
1
2 +max	j).
Thus 	 i “-separates” 	i if and only if
max	i  min	i 
X
j6=i
(max	j  min	j).
Now the argument of Section 3 can be adapted to show that if  < 1=(I  1), all pairs
of distinct payoff types are strategically distinguishable from each other (under  belief
9The version of “pseudo-type diversity” that we report is sufﬁcient to implement the social choice func-
tions depending just on payoff types that we study in this paper. Artemov et al. (2008) assume a slightly
stronger version of pseudo-type diversity: they assume that each Ti is ﬁnite and that distinct pseudo-
types have distinct preferences over constant lotteries even if they correspond to the same payoff type,
i.e., (i,i),( 0
i ,0
i) 2 Ti and (i,i) 6= ( 0
i ,0
i) ) Ri ,i 6= R0
i ,0
i. This allows them to implement richer social
choice functions that treat types with the same payoff types (but different beliefs over others’ payoff types)
differently.
10This example has a continuum of payoff types, so does not ﬁt our formal framework. But we could
make the same point with a ﬁnite grid of payoff types.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 73
restrictions) and thus incentive compatibility is sufﬁcient for robust virtual implemen-
tation. And if  > 1=(I  1), all pairs of payoff types are strategically indistinguishable
from each other (under  belief restrictions) and robust virtual implementation is im-
possible for any (non-constant) social choice function.
6.4 Rationalizability and all equilibria on all type spaces
Our analysis takes as given the solution concept of incomplete information rationaliz-
ability for our environment. Thus we assume that if the agents’ true payoff type proﬁle
was  =(1,...,I), they might send any message proﬁle
m ¬(m1,...,mI)2
I

i=1
Si[M](i)¬S[M]().
Our motivation for employing this solution concept is that we do not want to make any
assumption about agents’ beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents’ payoff
types. In fact, suppose one constructed a “type space” T specifying for each agent a set
of possible epistemic types, and, for each epistemic type, a description of his (known)
payoff type and his beliefs about others’ epistemic types. By standard universal type
space arguments, we can incorporate any beliefs and higher order beliefs about oth-
ers’ payoff types in such a type space. Now the type space T and a mechanism M
together deﬁne a standard incomplete information game. The set of messages that can
be sent by any type of agent i with payoff type i in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the game (T ,M) for any type space T is equal toSi[M](i). This result is the straight-
forward incomplete information extension of the classic epistemic foundations result
of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), showing that the set of actions that can be played
in the subjective correlated equilibria of a complete information game equals the set of
actions that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated actions in that game. Batti-
galli and Siniscalchi (2003) report the incomplete information version of this result as
Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. For completeness, we formally state and prove this result in
the appendix of the working paper version (Bergemann and Morris 2007).
This observation means that the gap between the solution concepts of pure strat-
egy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Serrano and Vohra 2001, 2005) and iterated deletion of
(interim) strictly dominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima 1992c) in incomplete in-
formation virtual implementation disappears in our robust approach. We consider this
to be an attraction of our approach. The intuition is that the extra bite obtained by the
assumption of equilibrium is lost without complementary strong assumptions on be-
liefs and higher order beliefs for the implementation problem.
6.5 Iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies
Our incomplete information rationalizability solution concept is equivalent to iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies. What happens if we look at iterated deletion of74 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
weakly dominated strategies instead? In other words, we let W 0
i [M](i)=Mi,
W k+1
i [M](i)
=
8
> <
> :
mi 2W k
i [M](i)








9 i 2++f( i,m i)jm i 2W k
 i[M]( i)g s.t.
mi 2argmax
m0
i
P
 i,m ii( i,m i)ui(g(m0
i,m i),(i, i))
9
> =
> ;
and
Wi[M](i)=
\
k0
W k
i [M](i).
It is easy to see that our “negative” results go through unchanged. If two types are pair-
wise inseparable (i  0
i) then the argument of Proposition 1—unchanged—implies
that they have iteratively weakly undominated actions in common in every mechanism,
or
Wi[M](i)\Wi[M](0
i)6=? for all M.
Thusrobustmeasurabilityisanecessaryconditionforimplementation(virtualorexact)
of any social choice function in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in a
ﬁnite (or compact) mechanism: the argument of Theorem 2 goes through unchanged in
this case.
Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show that their argument for virtual complete in-
formation implementation in iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies can be
adapted to show the possibility of exact complete information implementation in iter-
ated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, with some extra restrictions on the envi-
ronment. It is a reasonable conjecture that this extension can be adapted to the stan-
dard incomplete information implementation setting of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)
and our robust incomplete information setting. However, we have not attempted this
extension.
ChungandEly(2001)showthatinanauctionenvironmentwithinterdependentval-
uations as in Section 3, the efﬁcient outcome can be implemented in the direct mecha-
nism under iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (i.e., the solution concept
described above) under the assumption that  < 1=(I  1). Our results supply a strong
converse: if   1=(I  1), it is not possible to implement (exactly or virtually) any non-
trivial social choice function in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in any
ﬁnite (or compact) mechanism, direct or indirect.11
6.6 Implementation in a direct mechanism
We restrict attention in this paper to ﬁnite mechanisms. Thus the mechanisms here
do not include any of the pathological features of “integer games” that play an impor-
tant role in the full implementation literature and have been much criticized (see, e.g.,
11Our results are stated for a lottery space over ﬁnite outcomes, but the extension to any compact space
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Jackson 1992). Nonetheless, the mechanisms in this paper are complex. The canonical
mechanism for robust virtual implementation inherits the complexity of the mecha-
nism of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), on which it builds. Our maximally revealing
mechanism generating strategic distinguishability is no simpler. While the mechanisms
aretheoreticallykosher,ithasbeenarguedthattheircomplexityandthelogicoftheiter-
ation deletion in the mechanism might make them hard to use in practise. For example,
Glazer and Rosenthal (1992) have made this argument about the mechanism used by
Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) for complete information virtual implementation (see
Abreu and Matsushima 1992a for a response and Sefton and Yavas 1996 for later experi-
ments inspired by the mechanism).
By requiring robustness to agents’ beliefs and higher order beliefs, we reduce the
amount of common knowledge about the environment that can be used by the plan-
ner in designing a mechanism. This makes it harder to achieve positive results (and
our robust measurability condition is rather strong in applications). But one motivation
for studying robust implementation is that we hope that robustness considerations will
endogenously lead to simpler mechanisms when positive results can be achieved. By
adapting results from our earlier work on exact robust implementation in direct mech-
anisms (Bergemann and Morris forthcoming), we can report that, in at least one broad
class of economic environments of interest, whenever robust virtual implementation
is possible according to Corollary 1, it is possible in a direct mechanism where agents
simply report their payoff types. We say that preferences satisfy aggregator single cross-
ing (ASC) if each agent i’s preferences at type proﬁle  belong to a single crossing class
parameterized by hi(), where hi :  ! R is a monotonic aggregator. Bergemann and
Morris(forthcoming)establishedthatexactrobustimplementationbyacompactmech-
anism is possible if and only if the social choice function satisﬁes strict ex post incentive
compatibility and a contraction property on the aggregator functions h =(h1,...,hI). In
the appendix of the working paper version, we show that under the ASC assumption,
robust measurability is always satisﬁed under the contraction property.
6.7 Exact implementation and integer games
The ﬁrst papers on incomplete information implementation focus on exact implemen-
tation. PostlewaiteandSchmeidler(1986)andJackson(1991)identifyaBayesianmono-
tonicity condition that (together with Bayesian incentive compatibility) is necessary
and (under weak economic conditions) sufﬁcient for exact implementation in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. Bergemann and Morris (2005a) provide a robust analogue of this re-
sult, showing that ex post incentive compatibility and a robust monotonicity condition
are necessary and—under weak economic conditions—sufﬁcient for exact robust im-
plementation. All these papers follow a tradition in the implementation literature of
allowing very badly behaved mechanisms, like integer games, in proving their general
results. In this paper, we follow Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) in restricting attention
toﬁnite—andthuswell-behaved—mechanisms. Webrieﬂydiscusstherelationbetween
these results in this section; a more complete and formal discussion in contained in the
appendix of the working paper version (Bergemann and Morris 2007).76 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
Robust measurability and robust monotonicity turn out to be equivalent in the im-
portant class of aggregator single crossing preferences. However, in general, one can
show by example that robust measurability neither implies nor is implied by robust
monotonicity. Thus requiring only virtual implementation is sometimes a strict relax-
ation, and allowing badly-behaved mechanisms is sometimes a strict relaxation. We
do not have a characterization of when exact robust implementation by a well behaved
mechanismispossible(justasanalogouscharacterizationsdonotexistforcompletein-
formation and classical Bayesian implementation). We know only that robust measura-
bility, robust monotonicity, and strict ex post incentive compatibility are all necessary.
We restrict attention in our analysis to social choice functions rather than social
choice correspondences. Bergemann and Morris (2005b) consider the problem of par-
tially robustly implementing a social choice correspondence, i.e., ensuring that what-
ever players’ beliefs and higher order beliefs about others’ types, there is an equilibrium
leading to outcomes contained in the social choice correspondence. In the special case
where the social choice correspondence is a function (and more generally in a class of
separable environments), this is possible only if the function (or a selection from the
correspondence in separable environments) is ex post incentive compatible. But in the
general case, we do not have a satisfactory characterization of when partial robust im-
plementation is possible. For this reason, we have not attempted a characterization of
(full) robust implementation of social choice correspondences.
Appendix
This appendix contains omitted proofs from the main body of the paper.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i))
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(x,(i, i)) (22)
for all x 2X. If
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i))>
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(x0,(i, i))
for some x0 2X, we could conclude that
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i))>
1
N
X
x2X
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(x,(i, i))
=
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i)),
a contradiction. So (22) implies
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i))=
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(x,(i, i)) (23)Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 77
for all x 2 X. But (23) implies that Ri,i is indifferent between all pure outcomes and
thus all lotteries. This contradicts Assumption 1 of no-complete-indifference. We con-
clude that the no-complete-indifference assumption implies that (22) fails for all i, i.e.,
that for all i, i 2i and i 2( i), there exists x 2X such that
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(x,(i, i))>
X
 i2 i
i( i)ui(¯ y,(i, i)).
Equivalently, for all i, i 2i and i 2( i),
max
x2X
X
 i2 i
i( i)[ui(x,(i, i)) ui(¯ y,(i, i))]>0.
Now, note that for each x 2X the function
X
 i2 i
i( i)[ui(x,(i, i)) ui(¯ y,(i, i))]
iscontinuousin(inthestandardtopology). Theconclusionfollowsfromthecompact-
ness (in the standard topology) of ( i) and continuity of the maximum operator. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Fix any mi = 2 Si[M](i). Then there exists k such that mi 2
Sk
i [M](i) and mi = 2Sk+1
i [M](i). Consider
k
i =

i 2( i M i)ji( i m i)>0)m i 2Sk
 i[M]( i) for each j 6=i
	
.
For all i 2k
i , there exists ¯ mi such that
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)ui(g( ¯ mi,m i),(i, i))>
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)ui(g(mi,m i),(i, i)).
By the compactness of k
i , there exists ¯ "i(mi) > 0 such that for all i 2 k
i there exists
¯ mi such that
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)ui(g( ¯ mi,m i),(i, i))
>
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)ui(g(mi,m i),(i, i))+ ¯ "i(mi).
Now let
M = min
i, i and mi = 2Si[M](i)
¯ "i(mi),
which establishes the desired bound. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose +C 0M0. We argue, by induction on k, that
(m0
i ,m1
i )2Sk
i [M](i))m0
i 2Sk
i [M 0](i)78 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
for all k  0. This is true by deﬁnition for k = 0. Suppose that it is true for k. Now sup-
pose that m0
i = 2Sk+1
i [M 0](i) but (m0
i ,m1
i ) 2Sk+1
i [M](i) and so (m0
i ,m1
i ) 2Sk
i [M](i)
and, by the inductive hypothesis, m0
i 2Sk
i [M 0](i). Now ﬁx any i 2 ( i M i) sat-
isfying
i( i,(m0
j ,m1
j )j6=i)>0)(m0
j ,m1
j )j6=i 2Sk
 i[M]( i))m0
 i 2Sk
 i[M 0]( i).
Let
¯ i( i,m0
 i)=
X
(m1
j )j6=i2M1
 i
i( i,(m0
j ,m1
j )j6=i).
By Lemma 4, there exists ¯ m0
i such that
X
 i,m0
 i
¯ i( i,m0
 i)[ui(g 0( ¯ m0
i ,m0
 i),(i, i)) ui(g 0(m0
i ,m0
 i),(i, i))]>M0.
Thus
X
 i,m i
i( i,m i)

ui(g(( ¯ m0
i ,m1
i ),m i),(i, i)) ui(g((m0
i ,m1
i ),m i),(i, i))

>0M0  +C 0.
This contradicts our premise that (m0
i ,m1
i ) 2 Sk+1
i [M](i), and we conclude that
(m0
i ,m1
i )2Sk+1
i [M](i))m0
i 2Sk+1
i [M 0](i). 
The canonical mechanism asks each agent to make a series of binary choices be-
tween the central lottery ¯ y and a speciﬁc lottery y from the test set. If the test set is to be
successful in eliciting the private information from agent i, then the test set should con-
tain a sufﬁcient number of allocations such that for every type i and every belief i of
agent i there exists some allocation y that is strictly preferred to the central lottery ¯ y.
Lemma 9 (Duality). The type set proﬁle 	 i separates 	i if and only if there exists e y :	i !
Y such that X
i2	i
(e y(i)  ¯ y)=0 (24)
and
e y(i)Pi,i ¯ y (25)
for all i 2	i and all i 2(	 i).
This result says that for each i 2	i, we can identify a direction in the lottery space,
e y(i)  ¯ y, that agent i likes whatever his beliefs about 	 i, such that the sum of those
changes add up to zero. The lemma follows from the following duality result in Samet
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Proposition 5 (Samet 1998). Let V1,...,V S be closed, convex, subsets of the N-dimen-
sional simplex N. These sets have an empty intersection if and only if there exist
z1,...,zS 2RN such that
S X
s=1
zs =0
and
v zs >0 for each s =1,...,S and v 2Vs.
This result is introduced in Samet (1998) to provide a simple proof of the observa-
tion that asymmetrically informed agents trade against each other if and only if they do
not share a common prior, i.e., their posterior beliefs cannot be derived by updating a
common prior.12 Suppose that there are N states and S agents. Each agent s observes
one of a collection of signals about the true state. Each signal leads him to have a pos-
terior v 2 N over the states. Let Vs be the convex hull of his set of possible posteriors.
Notice that Vs represents the set of prior beliefs he might have held over the state space
before observing his signal. Thus posterior beliefs are consistent with a common prior
if and only if the intersection of the Vs sets is non-empty. Now consider a multilateral
bet specifying that if state n is realized, agent s receives payment zsn where the total
payments sum to zero:
S X
s=1
zsn =0 for all n.
Writing zs ¬(zsn)N
n=1, we then have
S X
s=1
zs =0.
There exists such a bet where every agent has a strictly positive expected value from
accepting the bet conditional on every signal if v zs >0 for each s =1,...,S and v 2Vs.
Proof of Lemma 9. By deﬁnition, the type set proﬁle 	 i separates 	i if, for every R 2
R, there exists i 2	i such that Ri,i 6=R for every i 2(	 i). Write
X =fx1,...,xn,...,xNg
i =f1
i ,...,s
i ,...,S
i g
 i =f1
 i,...,w
 i,...,W
 i g,
with W =SI 1. The vector
vsw =(ui(xn,(s
i ,w
 i)))N
n=1
isanelementofRN. Withoutlossofgenerality(sinceexpectedutilitypreferencescanbe
represented by any afﬁne transformation), we can assume that each vsw is an element
12ThisconversetothenotradetheoremwasoriginallyprovedbyMorris(1994),byamoreindirectduality
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of the N-dimensional simplex N. Now (vsw)W
w=1 is a collection of W elements of N,
and the set of preferences
fRs
i ,i :i 2(	 i)g
is represented by the convex hull of (vsw)W
w=1, which we write as
Vs =conv
 
(vsw)W
w=1

N.
Thus 	 i separates 	i exactly if
S \
s=1
Vs =?.
By Proposition 5, this is true if and only if there exist z1,...,zS 2RN such that
S X
s=1
zs =0 (26)
and
v zs >0 (27)
foralls andallv 2Vs. Butif(zs)S
s=1 satisfy(26)and(27), wemaychoose" >0sufﬁciently
small such that e y(s
i )= ¯ y +"zs 2Y for each s, and we have established (24) and (25).
Conversely, if (24) and (25) hold and we set zs = e y(s
i )  ¯ y for s =1,...,S, then (zs)S
s=1
satisfy (26) and (27). 
We now use Lemma 9 to show how, if 	 i separates 	i, we can construct a ﬁnite
set of lotteries e Yi(	i,	 i)Y such that knowing that agent i knows that his opponent’s
type is in 	 i and knowing his preferences on e Yi(	i,	 i) is always enough to rule out at
least one type in 	i for agent i.
Lemma 10. If 	 i separates 	i, then there exists a ﬁnite set e Yi(	i,	 i)  Y such that for
each i 2	i and i 2(	 i), there exists y 2 e Yi(	i,	 i) such that
¯ y Pi,i y (28)
and for some 0
i 2	i,
y P0
i ,0
i ¯ y (29)
for all 0
i 2(	 i).
Proof. By Lemma 9, there exists e y :	i !Y such that
X
i2	i
(e y(i)  ¯ y)=0
and
e y(i)Pi,i ¯ y for all i 2	i and i 2(	 i).Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 81
Let e Yi(	i,	 i) = fe y(i)gi2	i. Fix i 2 	i and i 2 (	 i). Write e Yi(	i,	 i) =
fy 1,...,y Kg, with y 1 = e y(i). Let ¯ y 0 = ¯ y and
¯ y l = ¯ y +"
l X
=1
(y    ¯ y),
with " > 0 chosen sufﬁciently small such that ¯ y l 2 Y for all l = 1,...,K. We know
¯ y 1 Pi,i ¯ y 0. Suppose ¯ y l+1 Ri,i ¯ y l for all l = 1,...,K   1. By transitivity, this implies
that ¯ y K Pi,i ¯ y 0. But ¯ y K = ¯ y 0, so we have a contradiction. We conclude that, for some
l = 1,...,K  1, ¯ y l Pi,i ¯ y l+1. This implies that there exists 0
i such that ¯ y Pi,i y(0
i).
Since
y(0
i)P0
i ,0
i ¯ y for all 0
i 2(	 i),
the inequalities (28) and (29) are established. 
Nowweconstructalargeenoughﬁnitesetoflotteries(the“testset”)suchthatknow-
ing just an agent’s most preferred outcome on the test set always reveals enough infor-
mation about his preferences to separate out a type, if it is possible to do so.
The proof of Lemma 7 is constructive. We ﬁrst construct a set e Y consisting of the
degenerate lotteries X and the sets e Yi(	i,	 i) constructed in Lemma 10, for every triple
(i,	i,	 i) with 	 i separating 	i. Knowing an agent’s ranking of each element of e Y
relative to the central lottery ¯ y reveals all the information we need to extract. In order
to extract this information in a single choice, we let the agent pick f : e Y ! f0,1g. For
each y 2 e Y, y is chosen with probability 1=e Y if f (y) = 1, otherwise the central lottery
¯ y is chosen. We let Y  be the set of all such lotteries. Now observing an agent’s most
preferredoutcomeinY  revealshisbinarypreferencebetween ¯ y andeachelementof e Y.
Since e Y contains each e Yi(	i,	 i), this ensures part (ii). Since e Y contains all the lotteries
that put probability 1 on each pure outcome, Assumption 1 (no-complete-indifference)
implies that, for each i and i, there exist y,y 0 2 e Y such that y Pi,i y 0 and thus y 0 = 2
BY 
i (i,i). This proves part (i).
Proof of Lemma 7. Let
e Y =X [
[
f(i,	i,	 i)j	 i separates 	ig
e Yi(	i,	 i).
Now for any f : e Y ! f0,1g, let yf be the lottery obtained by picking an element y 2 e Y
with uniform probability and then choosing lottery y if f (y) = 1 and ¯ y if f (y) = 0. Thus
we deﬁne
yf  ¯ y +
1
#e Y
X
y2e Y
f (y)(y   ¯ y).
Let Y  be the set of such lotteries, i.e.,
Y  =fy 2Y j9f : e Y !f0,1g such that y =yf g.82 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
To prove part (i) of the lemma, ﬁx any i 2 i and i 2 ( i). By Lemma 1, there
exists x 2X  e Y such that x Pi,i ¯ y; now let f 0(y)=0, for all y 2 e Y, and
f (y)=
(
0 if y 6=x
1 if y =x.
So we can write
yf 0 = ¯ y,yf  = ¯ y +
1
#e Y
(x   ¯ y)
and so yf 0 = 2 BY 
i (i,i).
To prove part (ii) of the lemma, suppose that 	 i separates 	i. Fix i 2 	i and i 2
(	 i). By Lemma 10, there exists y 2 e Yi(	i,	 i) and 0
i 2 	i such that ¯ y Pi,i y and
y P0
i ,0
i ¯ y for all 0
i 2(	 i). So
yf 2 BY 
i (i,i)) f (y)=0,
while
yf 2 BY 
i (0
i,	i)) f (y)=1,
and so
BY 
i (i,i)\ BY 
i (0
i,	i)=?,
which establishes the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider types i and 0
i such that i  0
i. Then by the def-
inition of pairwise inseparability, fi,0
ig 2 
i. By the construction of the inseparable
sets k
i , it follows that there is a ﬁnite stage ¯ k such that fi,0
ig2
¯ k
i but
fi,0
ig = 2
¯ k+1
i . (30)
By Lemma 7, for all i,k and mk
i we have
¯ k
i (mk
i )2k
i , (31)
and by Lemma 6, for each k there exists ¯ " >0 such that
fi 2i jmk
i 2Si[M k
" ](i)g ¯ k
i (mk
i ), (32)
for all " < ¯ " and mk
i 2 Mk
i . Now since  is established in a ﬁnite number of stages, it
follows that by the choosing k sufﬁciently large and " sufﬁciently small, we obtain an
augmented mechanism M K
" =M such that if i 0
i, then from the exclusion (30) and
the inclusions (31) and (32), it follows thatSM
i (i)\SM
i (0
i) = ?, which establishes the
result. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Fix mutually inseparable =(i)I
i=1. We use properties of
 to construct a type space T . For each 	i 2 i, there exists 	
	i
 i 2  i such that 	
	i
 i
does not separate 	i. Recall that “	
	i
 i does not separate 	i” means that there exists aTheoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 83
preference relation Ri over uncontingent lotteries Y such that for each i 2 	i, there
exists 
i,	i
i 2(	
	i
 i) such that R
i,
i ,	i
i
=Ri. Now, for each i, let
Ti ¬f(i,	i)2i i ji 2	ig, (33)
with
b i((j,	j)j6=i j(i,	i))¬
(

i,	i
i ( i) if 	 i =	
	i
 i
0 otherwise
(34)
and
b i(i,	i)¬i. (35)
Now consider the partition Hi of the type set Ti, as deﬁned through (33)–(35), that is
generated by the equivalence relation (i,	i)(0
i,	0
i) if 	i =	0
i. By construction, each
(i,	i) and (0
i,	i) are (T ,H )-indistinguishable. To see this, observe that since i,0
i 2
	i, there exists a common 	 i, namely 	
	i
 i such that 
i,	i
i (	
	i
 i)=
0
i ,	i
i (	
	i
 i)=1. Now,
as the type contingent lottery e yi has to be H -measurable, it follow in particular that it
has to be constant on 	
	i
 i and hence is an uncontingent lottery on 	
	i
 i. But Lemma 3
shows that if any payoff types i and 0
i are pairwise inseparable, then there exists a
mutually inseparable =(i)I
i=1 and 	k 2k with fk,0
kg	k.
(ii) For the other direction, ﬁx a type space T . Write H  for the limit of the sequence
ofpartitionsdeﬁnedaboveandletT
AMbethecorrespondingequivalencerelation. Write
H
i (ti)=ft 0
ijt 0
i T
AM tig and let
i ¬

	i 22i n?j9ti 2Ti such that 	i =fi j9t 0
i 2H
i (ti) with b i(t 0
i)=ig
	
.
Intuitively, i is a set of payoff types that cannot be distinguished on the particular (in-
terim) type space T .
Fix a player i and any ti 2Ti, and let
	i =

i j9t 0
i 2H
i (ti) with b i(t 0
i)=i
	
.
Suppose t 0
i T
AM ti. We know that for every H -measurable e yi, e yi T
ti ¯ y ) e yi T
t 0
i
¯ y. Observe that each t 0
i 2 H
i (ti) must have the same support on elements of H 
 i. Pick
any t 
 i such that b i(H
 i(t 
 i)jt 0
i) > 0 for all t 0
i 2 H
i (ti). Consider 
i,	i
i (	
	i
 i) that equals
the uniform lottery everywhere except on t i with tj T
AM t 
j for all j 6=i, i.e.,
e yi(t i)= ¯ y if not tj T
AM t 
j for some j.
Note that e yi is H -measurable. Now let 	j = fj j 9t 0
j 2 H
j(t 
j ) with b j(t 0
j) = jg
and observe that by construction, 	i is not separated by 	 i. Thus  is mutually
inseparable. 
The proof of Proposition 4 follows directly from the monotone behavior of the fol-
lowing auxiliary sets related to the inseparable sets. In Section 2.3 we deﬁne a sequence84 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
of inseparable sets, fkg1
k=0 = f(k
1,...,k
I )g1
k=0, where the k +1st level of sets is deter-
mined by an inductive step:
k+1
i =

	i 2k
i j	 i does not separate 	i, for some 	 i 2k
 i
	
. (36)
For our monotonicity result, it is useful to simply ﬁx a sequence of sets for all agents
except i:
fk
 ig1
k=0 =f(k
1,...,k
i 1,k
i+1,...,k
I )g1
k=0
such that the sequence satisﬁes the inclusion property
k+1
j k
j ,
but without necessarily coming from the separation property as k+1
j in (36). However,
foragenti, k
i isgeneratedbytheseparationpropertyrelativetothesequencefk
 ig1
k=0.
In particular, 0
i =2i n? and
k+1
i ¬f	i 2k
i j	 i does not separate 	i, for some 	 i 2k
 ig
and the resulting limit set is deﬁned by

i =
\
k0
k
i .
Now we consider two sequences of sets for all agents i, fb k
 ig1
k=0 and fk
 ig1
k=0, such
that one sequence is nested in the other, or for all k, b k
 i  k
 i. We then compare the
resulting limit set for agent i with respect to k
 i and b k
 i respectively. Correspondingly,
we denote the respective limit sets of agent i by 
i and b 
i.
Lemma 11 (Monotonicity I). If for all k, b k
 i k
 i, then b 
i 
i.
Proof. It sufﬁces to show that for all k, b k
i  k
i . The proof is by induction. By con-
struction it is true for k = 0. Suppose now that it holds for k and we want to establish
that it holds for k +1. By assumption, b k
i  k
i and hence consider a set 	i 2 k
i \ b k
i .
Now suppose that 	i 2 b k+1
i and we want to show that 	i 2 k+1
i . We observe that if
	i 2 b k+1
i , then there exists some 	 i 2 k
 i such that 	 i does not separate 	i. But by
assumption the set 	 i 2k
 i, and hence it follows that 	i 2k+1
i as well. 
Lemma 12 (Monotonicity II). If b i >i, then for all k, k
i  b k
i .
Proof. Theproofisbyinduction. Byconstructionitistruefork =0. Supposenowthat
it holds for k and we want to establish that it holds for k +1. By assumption, k
i  b k
i
and hence consider a set 	i 2 k
i \ b k
i . Now suppose that 	i 2 k+1
i and we want to
show that 	i 2 b k+1
i . We observe that if 	i 2 k+1
i , then there exists some 	 i 2 k
 iTheoretical Economics 4 (2009) Robust virtual implementation 85
such that 	 i does not separate 	i. In other words, there exists for every i 2	i a belief
i(ji)2(	 i) such that for all x 2X and all 0
i,00
i 2	i,
(1 i)vi(x,0
i)+i
X
 i2 i
i( i j0
i)wi(x, i)
=(1 i)vi(x,00
i )+i
X
 i2 i
i( i j00
i )wi(x, i).
As the interdependent utility wi() does not depend on i, we can rewrite the equality as
(1 i)(vi(x,0
i) vi(x,00
i ))=i
X
 i2 i
(i( i j00
i ) i( i j0
i))wi(x, i). (37)
Nowwewanttoshowthatif b i >i,thenwecanagainﬁndassociatedbeliefs b i( i j00
i )
such that
(1 b i)(vi(x,0
i) vi(x,00
i ))= b i
X
 i2 i
(b i( i j00
i ) b i( i j0
i))wi(x, i). (38)
We can easily verify that by letting for all  i 2 i the beliefs b i( i ji) be deﬁned by
b i( i ji)¬
(1 b i)i
b i(1 i)
i( i j00
i )+
b i  i
b i(1 i)
1
(I  1)S
we satisfy (38) if and only if we satisfy (37). Now since b i >i, it follows that
(1 b i)i
b i(1 i)
<1,
and hence the conditional probability distribution b i( i j i) is well-deﬁned if, as as-
sumed, i( i ji) is well-deﬁned. But now it follows that 	i 2 b k+1
i as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) For  = 0, we have by the deﬁnition of the private value
utility function vi() for all i and all i and 0
i, Ri(i, i) \ Ri(0
i, i) = ?. Hence it
follows that we have for all i, 
i(0)=ff1
i g,...,fS
i gg. For =1, we have by the deﬁnition
of the interdependent value function wi(), for all i and all 0
i 2i,
\
i2i
Ri(i, i)=Ri(0
i, i),
and hence for all i, 
i(1)=2i n?.
(ii) It sufﬁces to establish the result component-wise. We thus consider b    such
that b i > i for some i and b j = j for all j 6= i. Now suppose that for some agent l , we
have 
l() 6= 
l(b ). Then there must be a ﬁrst stage k0 such that k0
l () 6= k0
l (b ), but for
all k < k0, we have for all l, k
l () = k
l (b ). Now since we only changed the preferences
of agent i, and k0 is the ﬁrst stage where the sets k0
l () and k0
l (b ) differ, it must be that
l = i. But now it follows from Lemma 12 that k0
i ()  k0
i (b ). Suppose now that there is86 Bergemann and Morris Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
a step k00 >k0 such that there exists j 6=i such that k00
j ()6=k00
j (b ), but for all k <k00, we
have k
j ()=k
j (b ). Now we can apply Lemma 11 to conclude that k
j ()k
j (b ). Now a
monotonicity argument of either Lemma 11 or 12 applies at every further step along the
sequence and hence we have shown that for all j, including i, we have k
j ()k
j (b ) for
all k, which establishes the result. 
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